Research using fMRI to investigate complex cognitive behaviour, or controversial political issues, is often criticized – sometimes unfairly, but also often for good reasons. (A colleague of mine is prone to quip: “You shouldn’t conduct fMRI experiments that involve regions anterior to the central sulcus!”) In general, many of the problems with such fMRI studies stem from a more fundamental problem: on the one hand we want to know more about the most complex behaviour and cognitive mechanisms exhibited by the human brain (how are political beliefs formed?, what is romantic love?, etc.); on the other hand, due to this complexity, it is seldom possible to design experiments that lend themselves to a straightforward, and clear cut, interpretation.
A new study, in press at Neuroscience Letters, illustrates this conundrum. Mario Beauregard and Vincent Paquette scanned 15 Carmelite nuns as they experienced what the abstract refer to as a “a state of union with God”. In other words, Beauregard and Paquette have tried to design an imaging study that can tell us something about what goes on in the brain of people having a mystical experience. There are several reasons why this is interesting. One, mystical experiences are clearly, by themselves, a fascinating type of phenomenal experience. Scondly, since mystical experiences are very rare, it is naturally of interest to know more about why people sometimes leave their normal state of mind and engage in such “spiritual” experiences. And thirdly, understanding the neurobiological underpinnings of mystical experiences can help us understand the more basic question why religions are such an attraction to humans.
The problem with Beauregard and Paquette’s study lies in the unprecise nature of the experimental design. Beauregard and Paquette acquired MR images of the nuns’ BOLD signal vis-a-vis three different conditions: (1) a mystical condition, (2) a control condition, and (3) a baseline condition. Here’s how these three conditions are described in the paper:
In the Mystical condition, subjects were asked to remember and relive (eyes closed) the most intense
mystical experience ever felt in their lives as a member of the Carmelite Order. This strategy was adopted given that the nuns told us before the onset of the study that “God can’t be summoned at will.” In the Control condition, subjects were instructed to remember and relive (eyes closed) the most intense state of union with another human ever felt in their lives while being affiliated with the Carmelite Order. The week preceding the experiment, subjects were requested to practice these two tasks. The Baseline condition was a normal restful state (eyes closed).
In other words, what was actually investigated was the memory of previous mystical experiences, more so than the actual “union with God” proclaimed in the abstract. Beauregard and Paquette’s idea i now to compare the mystical condition with the control and the baseline condition. It is however somewhat unclear how the memory of a mystical experience match the memory of an “intense state of union with another human” (who?), and thus how the two conditions can be compared.
Another concern is the very long duration of the individual blocks. Each block lasted 5 minutes, which makes perfect sense from the point of view of the task (after all, the subject needs time to bring about the two principal conditions), but makes it enormously difficult to know what is being modelled by the analysis. To my knowledge no theory exists detailing how the time-course of calling up a memory of a mystical experience unfolds; hence, exactly what cognitive processes are reflected by the BOLD signal remain uncertain. Moreover, it is hard to make sure that people concentrate on just one cognitive task for such a long time, so the results may be contamined by unrelated mental activity.
Still, with these serious caveats in mind, it is interesting to see that the contrast between remembering the experience of a union with God and remembering the experience of a union with another human produce significant acitivity in a number of brain areas (medial OFC, medial PFC, dorsal ACC, middle temporal cortex, and the inferior and superior parietal lobule), albeit at p<0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons. This result indicate that (the memory of) mystical experiences do have some particular neural correlate, although the design of the experiment makes it impossible to say what the function of the brain regions mentioned above amount to.
Now, it is obviously highly unclear what this experiment shows, but this doesn’t make it a failed study in my view. Whenever we deal with complex cognitive processes, we have to start somewhere. If other researchers use others conditions we may slowly be able to piece together the puzzle of what these activations mean.
Reference
Beauregard, M. & Paquette, V. (2006): Neural correlates of a mystical experience in Carmelite nuns. Neuroscience Letters, in press.
-Martin
I’ve not read the study itself, so the following is based on a quote in an online medical news source (at http://www.pharma-lexicon.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=50776).
The article’s third paragraph discusses the study’s methodology:
“Fifteen cloistered Carmelite nuns ranging from 23 to 64-years-old were subjected to an fMRI brain scan while asked to relive a mystical experience rather than actually try to achieve one. “I was obliged to do it this way seeing as the nuns are unable to call upon God at will,” said Beauregard [Dr. Mario Beauregard of the University’s Department of Psychology]. This method was justified seeing as previous studies with actors asked to enter a particular emotional state activated the same brain regions as people actually living those emotions.”
Leaving aside the open question of whether a mystical experience is simply a kind of mental or emotional experience with no actual spiritual component, or is a spiritual experience which may include a mental or emotional component, there is the additional open question of whether or not spiritual causes — assuming that they exist — always have quantifiable material effects by which they can be measured . In other words, since the scientific method only applies to that which can be observed, measured, and duplicated, not to the existence and/or effects of a transcendent, unpredictable, non-material reality, this has profound implications on whether or not “the neural correlates of a mystical experience” can be reliably tested.
Metaphysics aside, I see two logical fallacies:
First, the study as presented above commits the fallacy of the Weak Analogy, thus: “Mystical experiences are similar to (and may include) emotional experiences; emotional experiences produce the same brain activity whether experienced or relived; and therefore, mystical experiences produce the same brain activity whether experienced or relived.”
Presumably, the studies of actors entering emotional states and people actually living those emotions involved brain scans of both groups. Without brain scans of those actually having mystical experiences (a difficult thing to reliably identify and measure, to say the least), this strength of this analogy is unconfirmed. (Although, if such brain scans were available, the analogy would be unnecessary.)
Second, there is the problem of Unrepresentative Sample. Given the variety of mystical traditions and practices within both Christian and non-Christian traditions, brain scans of fifteen Canadian Carmelite nuns may not be representative of the mental states of all mystics, and certainly no basis for a definite conclusion on “the neural correlates of a mystical experience.”
[…] Of course, neuroscientists aren’t just poaching on traditional philosophical territory; they are interested in spirituality as well. For example, a study published last year in Neuroscience Letters, (Volume 405, Issue 3, 25 September 2006, Pages 186-190) examined the neural correlates of mystical experience. The investigators used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study patterns of brain activation in 15 Carmelite nuns. For discussion of this study, see this link. […]
ultimately the procedure is completely wrong. mystical and spiritual experience? this must be defined, subjects must be studdied over long period of time. to actually catch one of these experience. we may want to actually test people that come into emergency rooms. they may be the group of people that are most likely about to have a near death/shiny light/see god experience.
Hello,
At age 33, in 1990, Kundalini left its indelible mark upon my neurology and may be of significant interest to you and the community at large. I believe that my pituitary and pineal glands have been affected such that I may now discharge, at will, what I perceive to be sizable blasts of some sort of neurological energy (electrochemical?). What is interesting is that a simple EEG may show extraordinary findings.
Among other things, I think that this information is very relative to brain evolution and has the power to answer many unresolved questions, but who is doing such research? Would you happen to know who I could talk to?
In addition, I have experienced the 7 seals or chakras and possess a great deal of interesting or even pertinent information for anyone’s evolution, spiritual or otherwise. Do you suppose there is any interest in having a mystic occupy a teaching post and if so, who to speak with about this?
I look forward to your advice or direction and thank you in advance.
Sincerely,
Brent Belchamber
250-382-8804
Brent56@telus.net
Victoria, BC. Canada
The DSM III characterizes mystics as
“psychotic, delusional, incoherent, illogical and hallicinating”
… suggesting a general psychopathology.
Even though this has been revised in later edition of the DSM for political reasons following strong representations from the Templeton foundation, I think it still applies to mystics who claim to have experienced the 7 seals of chackras, have the ability to blast neurological energy while hallucinating about a teaching position! That’s as close as you can get from being psychotic.
[…] weer..?) Het was bekend dat bepaalde delen van ons brein oplichten bij religieuze ervaringen (2006, Beauregard en Paquette) en datzelfde effect schijnen bepaalde merken te hebben. Maar een merk wordt niet zomaar religie […]