“It is much clearer that consciousness is determined by physical states of the brain than it is that a separate mind perceives and acts through the brain” (Stephen Walker, Animal Thought, 1983).
I am going over papers and books at the moment pertaining to the great reductionism problem (preparing a chapter for Thomas’ and mine forthcoming book), and I must confess that it baffles me why philosophers are so convinced of the existence of the mind. While we know that the brain exists, and are able to study its nature and function directly, we only know of the mind through indirect and unreliable means (behaviour, introspection). It seems to me that the questions should not so much be whether or not the mind can be reduced to the workings of the brain, as how the behaviour and cognitive functions we asociate with the mind can arise from neural activity – which is not the same question!
Naturally, there is a historical reason for the reductionism debate. Before mankind had any idea about the nature of physics or the brain, perception, memory, language, and other forms of “mental function”, were pondered as special metaphysical principles or entities – called the “soul” by the Greeks – inhering in the physical matter of the body. Hence, philosophers grabled with mental functions for thousands of years before physics and neuroscience made it possible to even begin investigating the brain. When the first really serious anatomical and physiological results of such investigations begang to appear in the 17th Century through the work of Vesalius, Willis, and others, it therefore came to a conflict between the old received idea of a non-material soul and the new mechanical wordview. How on Earth can the soul possibly be inhering in the physical properties of the brain? Well, according to Descartes, to whom this question first presented itself, surely only through some kind of mysterious linkage about which we cannot say anything. However, without the old assumed existence of the soul, there would not have been a need to reconceale mind and brain.
In parallel to Descartes, today philosophers seek to illuminate how mental functions and neural processes are linked through “bridge laws” and other forms of modern technical notions. Yet, as with Descartes, the question of how mental function and neural processes are linked is only raised by the very assumption that two separate substances – mind and brain – exist. If we don’t accept this metaphysical dualism, the reduction problem dissapear!
It is time to leave ancient metaphysics behind, people! The burden of proof rests with the “non-reductionists”: why should we accept the existence of “the mind”?
-Martin
You say: “we only know of the mind through indirect and unreliable means (behaviour, introspection).”
I’m sorry, but introspection is the absolute MOST drect experience of mind/consciousness, and the observation of behavior a secondary function, since all observation is mediated by the mind. The observation of brain functioning is a tertiary function, beging mediated by machines (1) which are interpreted by minds (2) that are trying to understand what thought is (3).
Your thinking reminds me of religious fundamentalists who claim to know The Truth, because they read it in a book. They are completely unconscious of the fact that the very act of reading and “comprehending” is interpretive, that it is mediated (and incomplete) awareness. You may want to leave metaphysics behind in your illusion of unmediated observation, but in the end, it is YOU that will be left behind.
To quote Blake, “intellectual enemies are spiritual friends.” So please understand my critique as an act of friendship.
Stephen Berer
Hi Stephen,
Thanks for bringing this obvious critique. However, I am confident that it’s missing the point. Neither Martin nor myself (doing scientific study of consciousness) argue that we don’t have feelings, thoughts or “introspection” (however you may want to define it). The question is: why do we/you need to argue that the mind has an existence by itself? Like Descartes, what is the argument for both a res extensa (the material body/brain) and res cogitans (the mind/soul)?
Of course, one can always resort to fundamental solipsism and argue that all I can know for certainty is that “I think”, or worse “thoughts occur to me”, but that is really not a valid option. Better, we can see that when a physical property such as the brain is injured, a correspondingly alteration is found in the mind/consciousness. Today, few, if any, would argue against a view that the brain in some way is responsible for the mind.
What is unresolved is how this comes to be the case. And here is where IMO all the “flaky stuff” comes into play. Martin’s question is: we do know that the brain in some way is responsible for the mind. So why do we need to think of the mind as belonging to a domain/dimension that is non-material?
As above, few would support what’s known as a substance dualism — the view that the mind and the brain are two different classes of objects. However, many would support a version of property dualism, which in its essence is similar to (or a subclass of) emergent materialism — i.e. the view that the mind is irreducible to the brain (though it depends on it to exist in the first place). This latter view is IMO really one of the greates epistemological fallacies in contemporary discussions, and I have yet to read or hear a convincing argument that the mind is somewhat emergent and non-reducible to the brain. Take the case of any (!) cognitive operation such as episodic memory or decision-making, and we can piece out the details for how these different functions work out in the brain, and there will (eventually) not be any “memory-ness” or “decision-making-ness” left to explain.
I find that our increasing knowledge about the brain can sort out each part of the puzzle for how the mind works. We can show that given a particular set of genes, a developmental history and so forth, we can descibe the effects on the neurotransmitter systems and how these influence the way the brain responds to different input.
In this view, the position of emergence is really a passive and agnostic take on the mind-brain problem. Just because it seems unsurmountable today that we should ever understand how the brain makes up its mind, it does not rule out that we will eventually reach such a “materalistic” and “reductionist” account of the brain-mind problem. As the border of this understanding is continually pushed back — as we show here on this blog — I am confident that the end point rules out any understanding of the mind as irreducible to the brain.
Martin’s post exactly coins this by asking: why whould we believe in a mind? As above, it does not deny that we have thoughts and feelings etc., but it asks why we should believe that the mind is irreducible to the brain.
-Thomas
“It is time to leave ancient metaphysics behind, people!”
I certainly hope that the emphasis on that sentence is “ancient” and not metaphysics–science cannot do without metaphysics, as the Vienna Circle and other logical postivists found, to their chagrin.
And let’s please not generalize about what philosophers are up to. You have quite a few who would agree that there is no such thing as the mind, a number of others who would note that perhaps the ‘mind’ is only the subjective experience of the brain (and is, as such, unexplorable in principle) and plenty of other positions.
If you put two philosophers in a room, you wind up with three philosophical positions. Being specific, and not sloppy, will help you here. If you want to talk about specific philosophers or specific philosophical positions, do. But do not talk about “philosophers” as though we all agree. It is, if I am feeling kind, sloppy, and if I am feeling unkind, lazy.
Philosophy of science has been invaluable to scientific research since before Einstein made the metaphysical breakthrough that Euclidean geometry was a metaphysical assumption. Do not throw out the baby with the bathwater.
Dear Thomas,
Thank your for your careful (and very respectful) response. But I have to tell you that my *experience* not any philosphical or spiritual predisposition moved me from a materialist to a person who is convinced that the mind transcends the brain. As I have experienced it, the brain is more a receiver, than a creater of thought. There is a vast body of evidence for this position, but it is mostly discounted as illusion and foolishness in the scientific community. What can I say? If my experience is illusion and/or foolishness (and I can’t be certain it *isn’t*!), then you are right and I am wrong.
Let me ask you this hypothetical question: suppose someone (who you were absolutely certain had no access to who you were and to your private life) was able to “read” your mind, and tell you things about your past that were so private, that perhaps only you yourself knew them. How would you explain that from your existing position? *Could* you explain that from your existing position? If you can do this, you’ll take me into new ground, and I will be very interested to explore it.
all the best,
Steve
Hi Steve,
Let’s respond to your question first: could I explain “extra-sensory” phenomena such as mind reading etc. (if this is how I understand you)? No, I would not. Indeed, any such a finding would shake the foundation of the current scientific explanation of the brain, not to forget much of materialism. So in order for this to occur, we’d need extraordinary strong evidence (yet only one valid demonstration) of such a case.
So, has there been any such demonstrations? Here, I find a strong and resounding “no”. First, most such supporting evidence comes from anecdotes and make-belief interpretations of a given event (hope that doesn’t sound too harsh). In experimental settings, any claimed finding has been disproved thoroughly on the grounds of validity and/or have not been reproducable. In other words, these findings fail to meet the very basic criteria for scientific evidence. Hence, we cannot accept such ideas as scientifically supported.
So, I would indeed have to revise my entire idea about the/my scientific view of the world. That is the absolute premise for doing science — being willing to revise your views. However, this is *always* with the premise in mind that any finding has to meet the rigid scientific criteria of validity and reproducibility, to mention two. In addition, a theory explaining this phenomenon must be — all other things being equal — be the simplest of any competing other theories. This is not trivial, since we might still have a naturalistic explanation of these kinds of findings. if you showed a television to a medieval man, he would think of it as magic defying any natural law. Yet we know today that there is a very natural explanation (though complicated) of how little humans get into the box called the tele.
But let me return and ask you a question similar to that given to Descartes when he taught his dualistic view of the mind-brain relationship: “if the brain is only the receiver (not the maker) of thought, how do thoughts get into the brain in the first place?”; and “why do we need a brain at all, since our thoughts should come from another place?”
What I’m trying to stress is the fundamental illogic of this position. If thoughts are independent of the brain – which is how I understand your suggestion – what is the meeting point of the “immaterial thought” and the physical brain? Such a question – and any potential explanation – leads to a reductio ad absurdum. It’s a basic critique of substance dualism.
best,
Thomas
I am grateful to Thomas for taking the time to respond to Steve and Liz’s comments. I will reply myself later this week in the form of two or three posts outlining my view on reductionism in more details.
best,
Martin
Ditto to Martin Skov’s comment.
Is a radio illogical? To some pre-industrial human it surely would be! The interaction between brain and mind is more complex than a radio, since the brain focuses, modifies, filters, blocks, and distorts mind, and is not a simple radio receiver.
It is amusing that we both laugh at each other’s illogic. Your illogic: all your materialist thoughts are mediated by consciousness, and, alas, we have absolutely no idea what consciousness is (and subsequently, what thought is). Neither thought nor consciousness have ever been detected or measured, or shown to even exist, tho we all believe they absolutely exist. You can’t prove I exist; you can’t even prove you exist! These “existences” are mere interpretations. Are you dreaming this? Prove to me you’re not.
smile. It’s a messy business, eh?
Steve
A good novelist knows if he or she wishes to sell books, then ‘soul’ is a powerful consideration: It follows then to write what soul is about… woman is closer to the soul…she is mother on conception…and the whole game of life is intertwined here.
Now what of the thought (consciousness) those who have returned after a near death experience? Are they different? Why? check out http://www.iands.com.
What of the woman who never learnt French, never heard it spoken, but after going into shock with her second child sprouted French. She was even swearing in French! (And the nurses told her to stop). So where did the French come from?
We are in a scientific mumbo jumbo precisely due to the limitations of Science, neuroscience, call it what you will…has anyone analysed magnetism or gravity correctly?
Let’s not forget that the behavoirists once claimed that even sensory experience did not really exist. There is no absurdity that people will not vehemently affirm once they adopt some given set of beliefs. Who are you going to believe – the “authority”, or your own lying eyes?(Or mind, in this case.) Many people will choose authority.